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ABSTRACT
Brazil has recently shifted from economic growth to recession, from
left-wing to far-right politics and from neo-developmentalist to
ultra-liberal economic policies. This regressive change in Brazil (and
elsewhere) has prompted the need for empirical investigation and
emancipatory movement-building, as urged by the Emancipatory
Rural Politics Initiative (ERPI). This article responds to the ERPI call
by reﬂecting on the politics of the past. It argues that the road to
regression was paved during the tenure of the Workers’ Party,
when Lula’s leadership emerged as representative of interests ‘from
below’ while advancing a political project that protected and
nurtured interests ‘from above’ - a populist ambiguity. By oﬀering
an understanding from a class political economy perspective, this
article concludes that reinforcing left-wing populism in the face of
authoritarianism is unlikely to create a path to emancipation.
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The Emancipatory Rural Politics Initiative (ERPI), launched in October 2017 by a group of
scholars, echoed growing concern over the rise of populist governments around the
world,many ofwhich are associatedwith authoritarian, right-wing and exclusionary politics.
In the ERPI framing article, Scoones et al. (2018) make ‘authoritarian populism’ their primary
focus and specify the ‘rural world’ as the site of their scholarly eﬀorts. As the authors point
out, the rural setting has served as both an electoral base for populist leaders and a base for
resistance and alternative politics. They argue that the spread of authoritarian populism is
not only a reason for concern, but also a call for emancipatory rural politics. Seeking to grasp
a better understanding of populism and its authoritarian form, the ERPI has called on scho-
lars to provide insights from their countries of study by considering whether and how the
rural context is aﬀected by, contributes, or reacts to populism.
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This article focuses on Brazil, a country where the economic and political tide has
recently changed. In 2016, Brazil entered a full-blown recession and underwent a
hostile impeachment process fueled by a popular uprising that brought to an end not
only the mandate of democratically elected president Dilma Rousseﬀ, but also a 13-year
period (2003–2016) during which the Workers’ Party (Partido dos Trabalhadores, PT) was
in power. After the impeachment process, policies shifted toward stark economic austerity
and the curtailment of labor rights. Such an authoritarian and reactionary U-turn was con-
solidated in October 2018 with the election of former military oﬃcer and congressman Jair
Bolsonaro, who openly espoused dictatorial principles, moral conservatism and ultra-econ-
omic liberalism. Fear, hate and hope, mobilized by a vicious presidential campaign,
boosted his political ascension. All of the above suggest that Brazil has joined the club
of right-wing authoritarian populist governments – a setback that has reached the coun-
tryside, and in contrasting ways.
It should be noted that 50% of the impeachment votes in the Chamber of Deputies
were cast by the so-called Agribusiness Parliamentary Front, which comprised 41% of
the total number of serving parliamentarians (Castilho 2017). Still in 2016, this agribusiness
caucus voted to shelve a corruption complaint lodged against interim president Michel
Temer, saving his mandate. In exchange for their congressional vote, Temer’s government
committedly fulﬁlled the agribusiness sector’s demands (Castilho 2017).
By contrast, the ‘family farm’ sector quickly started to experience the bitter eﬀects of
authoritarianism and austerity, including direct violence. In its ﬁrst week in power, the
interim government abolished the Ministry of Agrarian Development and eliminated or
severely reduced internationally celebrated programs that were providing support and
welfare to the rural poor, such as the Bolsa Família or the Food Acquisition Program
(PAA), among several other setbacks (see e.g. Pericás 2017 and Mitidiero Junior 2018).
Perhaps even more alarming was the sharp increase in the number of murders, death
threats, murder attempts, instances of torture and imprisonment of rural peoples since
the impeachment (CPT 2017).1
In face of this political throwback and the quickly deteriorating economic and social
conditions in rural areas, agrarian movements and other organized social forces have
been confronted with the pressing need to mobilize the masses to contest the drastic cut-
backs in public support, as well as to reclaim the loss of political representation in the gov-
ernment. As part of that endeavor, from August 2017 to March 2018, the Landless Workers’
Movement (Movimento dos Trabalhadores Sem Terra, MST) openly supported former pre-
sident Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva (Lula, for the PT) during a pre-presidential election
caravan that took place across the country. At the time, Lula was the PT’s oﬃcial candidate
and topped all opinion polls.
Together, these elements place Brazil at the center of the ERPI problematic, yet with a
caveat: the risk that scholarship as well as resistance and mobilization – which together
form the primary foci of the ERPI – would focus on recent political changes without
suﬃcient reﬂection on and learning from the politics of the past. This becomes imperative
given the suspicion that the road to regression did not start with the ousting of Rousseﬀ,
but was paved during the PT’s tenure, when the government enjoyed popular support and
1Between 2016 and 2017, 132 rural dwellers, many of whom in leadership positions, were murdered – a 100% increase in
the average number of murders per year compared with the 2005–2014 period (CPT 2017).
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its politics were celebrated for promoting a post-neoliberal and neo-developmentalist
project that primarily aﬀected the poor (see Sader 2013). Notably, the rural context was
central to the PT’s politics. It was not due to misfortune or mere coincidence, but rather
to critical political choices that Lula’s project was shipwrecked just after the end of the
global commodity boom.
Agricultural production and exports, which have undergone widespread expansion
since the early 2000s, have played a crucial albeit ambiguous role in the politics of the
PT. These were instrumental in bringing back economic stability and growth, enabling
the state to sponsor a new type of economic and social progress, which was central in
giving rise to and propelling the phenomenon of ‘Lulism’ (Singer 2009): the identiﬁcation
of Lula as representative of interests ‘from below’. Yet agricultural exports were also struc-
tural to a state-sponsored pattern of accumulation ‘from above’, clashing with the PT’s
claim of promoting a popular political project. The countryside became the backdrop
for strategy contradictions that placed the very poor in alliance with the dominant
classes. The mystiﬁcation of this ambiguous form by which the PT secured and exerted
power, and represented the interests of its social base, is characteristic of populism.
This phenomenon needs to be carefully understood so that its constitutive ﬂaws and
political consequences can be fully exposed and confronted. The ﬁrst section of this
article presents an understanding of populism in light of the class-based political
economy; this creates the foundations for the ensuing analysis of Lulism and the PT’s poli-
tics in three stages. The ﬁrst stage describes the way in which politics was perceived by the
people and how this shaped political outcomes. The second stage examines the economic
and social bases of politics, contrasting apparent and concrete social eﬀects. In the ﬁnal
stage, the article reﬂects on Lula’s model of populism to shed light on the recent regressive
turn and inform emancipatory politics.
Approaching populism
[… ] if social and political aspirations are not disciplined by careful theory and analysis, they
will lead to false prescription and to development policies which fail. Theory is not therefore a
mere intellectual indulgence, but, at its best, the most ‘practical’ of activities. (Kitching 1989, 5)
Since the end of the 1990s and throughout the 2000s, several left-leaning governments in
Latin America have surfed the commodity boom wave, promoting economic growth and
social development (Vergara-Camus and Kay 2017). The so-called ‘Pink Tide’ governments,
notably those in Ecuador, Bolivia and Venezuela, have been associated with left-wing or
neo-populism (de la Torre 2016; Andreucci 2017), and in a positive fashion. Echoing
such an assessment, Scoones et al. (2018, 3) note that neo-populist governments in the
region have been in favor of ‘the people’, once achieving ‘impressive gains in poverty
reduction and expanded political recognition and government support for previously mar-
ginalised groups’. Their interpretation seems to imply that populism, as long as it is not
right-wing and authoritarian, becomes a desirable feature of politics. It is unclear,
however, what is meant by the term populism itself. Certainly, not all popular and pro-
gressive politics are populist, just as not all populist politics are progressive. The same
applies to authoritarian, right-wing, xenophobic or other sorts of (populist) politics.
Drawing from Kitching’s opening quote, deﬁning and analyzing populism should not
be a mere intellectual indulgence, but rather a practical activity with important political
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consequences. Even though this article is not the space for extensive theoretical explora-
tion, key conceptual aspects of populism should be reﬂected upon so that real experiences
can be singled out and direct eﬀects exposed. Contrary to the Pink Tide governments
mentioned above, the Brazilian government has seldom been associated with populism,
even if also being at the forefront of extractivism and neo-developmentalism.
So, what is populism? Why would the PT government, under Lula’s leadership, make a
case for it? And why does this analysis matter? In light of the political economy, populism is
a political phenomenon and, as such, is entrenched in and unfolds into economic and
social phenomena, all of which must be reﬂected upon in the analysis. When conceptua-
lizing populism, it is essential that questions such as who controls what, who does what
and who gets what are addressed theoretically.
The political economy of populism
Democratic representation as a system of power, with populism as its fetish
The events of authoritarian populism that the ERPI is concerned with emerged between
the cracks of representative democracy – the formal governing system of most capitalist
economies, including Brazil. Populism is rooted in relations of representation, which, in the
context discussed here, are those between the state (as the representative) and citizens (as
the represented).
In a system of representative democracy, citizens have the power to elect (or reject) a
government through voting, which not only is a limited way of expressing preferences and
demands, but also has a limited scope for participation in decision-making. State represen-
tatives are the ones who can eﬀectively express, and decide how to implement, views on
public matters. An inevitable disposition of power therefore underlies political represen-
tation because of diﬀerences in agency and the decision-making capacities of those
with concrete needs, interests and demands, and those who voice and realize them on
their behalf.
It is therefore important to observe the political roles played by state agency and
decision-making power in representing societies whose social organization is based on
the monopoly of the means of production by a minority and wage employment of the
majority – the basis of the compulsion to purchase labor power (for commodity pro-
duction for proﬁt) and sell labor power (for material and social reproduction) (Fine and
Saad-Filho 2016). This means that, when governing, the state inevitably confronts social
interests arising from the (class) position of diﬀerent groups within capitalist social div-
isions. State policies will represent, protect and nurture particular social interests while
simultaneously remediating, neglecting or undermining others.
State political choices therefore express a class character, whereas maintaining political
control of the state denotes the political power of a class over the economy and society.
The state’s political choices are conditioned by and reﬂect social disputes over the (re)or-
ganization of property, as well as the processes of production, appropriation and accumu-
lation. This is why Wood argues that the state represents the ultimate locus of social force;
it is ‘the decisive point of concentration for all power in society’ (1995, 47).
As she rightly points out, even if ensuring the right to vote for all citizens (regardless of
socioeconomic position), the system of representative democracy has been opportune for
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maintaining the capitalist social order. Exerting ‘civic freedom and equality’ (1995, 201)
does not directly aﬀect the logic (and legitimacy) of private property, market compulsion
and the proﬁt maximization imperative forming the capitalist spheres of domination and
coercion (1995, 234). Even though democracy in its original and historical sense denotes
rule by the demos, “the people”, representative democracy conceals and legitimizes rule by
the dominant (propertied) classes (Wood 1995).
When embedded in state and society relations, populism further conceals the ﬂaws of
representative democracy while concurrently exacerbating them. As a corollary, democ-
racy as a whole is perceived to be more transparent, direct, legitimate and just while
becoming more arbitrary, personalistic and pernicious to the working class. Unsurprisingly,
populist leaders produce deep loyalties and cleavages, polarizing ‘their polities and the
academic community into those who regarded them as democratic innovators, and
those who considered them a threat to democracy’ (de la Torre 2017, 195). These tensions
have been evidenced in the recent debates on the ‘Pink Tide’ in Latin America. The next
section explains how populism aﬀects political representation in democratic capitalist
societies as a way of expanding the view introduced here.
Fetishism and ambiguous politics
What becomes distinctive in relations of representation when populism is embedded,
and what is particular to the manifestation of populism itself, is the existence of a
fetish: the fetish of a genuine popular democratic representation, or even of popular
power. Drawing upon Marx’s fetishism of the commodity (1992 [1867], Vol. 1, Chapter
1), fetishism is understood as a social perception or a collective construct of social
reality (needs, identity, rights etc.), which is formed, on the one hand, from concrete
social experiences of people, thereby corresponding to materiality. Yet, on the other
hand, it is a perception that obscures, misrepresents and ultimately conﬂicts with more
fundamental aspects of that same social reality at the abstract level – that of social
(class) relations. Fetishism is the mystiﬁcation of social relations, but it is not simply a
false or illusory perception of reality, or a phenomenon happening only in people’s
minds; it is ﬁrst and foremost a practical phenomenon expressing ideas that correspond
to (and shape) concrete forms of appearance of social reality. As such, a fetish is social and
historically determined.
Populism is fetishized politics of people’s representation, and thus associated with the
fetish of ‘the people’, the ‘common good’, ‘popular will’ or general welfare. The fetishiza-
tion of social matters may prompt discursive, ideological and social unity (mystifying class
and other social divisions). By default, fetishized social unity creates an equally mystiﬁed
social ‘other’. Social polarization is part of populism, as are changes in the social correlation
of forces and power relations.
In a democratic political system, populism often leads to the seizure of the state, expan-
sion and reproduction of the political power of social representation. A state representa-
tive becomes the direct voice of ‘the people’ and the agent that realizes the popular will.
Populism creates leaders (usually male) who are often seen as a ‘savior’, a ‘father’, a ‘hero’
or ‘one of us’, embodying the collective identity or will (Arditi 2005, 81–83). A fetishized
representative has greater public appeal not only as a matter of degree, but also
quality. Personal charisma or background, cultural or partisan identity, and rhetorical or
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discursive devices can reinforce the fetish of representation. These factors help populist
leaders to create a direct, unmediated, uninstitutionalized and quasi-personal relation
with the constituencies they claim to represent (Weyland 2001, 14).
Laclau, who remains inﬂuential in the academic debate on populism, associates this
phenomenon with a crisis of hegemonic power. However, drawing from a particular
understanding of Gramsci, he circumscribes power and political hegemony to the
spheres of discursive and ideological dominance (Laclau 1977), thus taking a partial
view on the capitalist forms of domination. A dominant class exerts hegemony through
the neutralization of potential resistance or conﬂicting ideologies of the dominated by
articulating some of their views, discourses and demands (1977, 161–62). That way, he
conceives of a ‘populism of the dominated’ (1977, 173–74) when the masses absorb
and articulate a popular ideology of their own, thereby challenging, antagonizing and
possibly overtaking the elite ideological hegemony. For Laclau, this would be not only
desirable, but also necessary to put an alternative political project in place.2
The idea of ‘people’s power’ detached from careful theorization can easily become an
unproblematic treatment of transformative politics, which is an important aspect of popu-
lism itself. First, one should not assume the immediate interest of ‘the people’ (or the domi-
nated) in defying the capitalist logic of social organization and inherent forms of
oppression, diﬀerentiation and inequality (Wood 1995). Second, one should be suspicious
of transformative politics arising from arbitrary popular unity, subjectively construed.
Third, one should be skeptical of the pursuit of transformative politics through political
representation – ‘won by proxy or conferred by benefaction’ (1995, 103) – instead of
through direct collective activity. Yet the populist fetish stalls people’s protagonism and
disempowers citizens. People become loyal to and reliant on a leadership that they
entrust to act on their behalf, thereby widening the gap in agency and decision-making
capacities between citizens and state representatives. Promoting social beneﬁts, a populist
leader favors the formation of a grateful and obedient mass (Lefort as mentioned in Arditi
2005, 96–97) instead of a critical, politically engaged and combative mass.
Finally, if progressive populism brings people’s voices, material aspirations and ideol-
ogies to the political stage, and possibly to the top of the political system – thereby over-
taking elite hegemony, as in Laclau’s view – how does this correspond to the
transformation of the (capitalist) patterns of property organization, production, distri-
bution and appropriation? This is the crux of the matter. An ideological ascendancy of
the dominated over the state’s politics is populist when (and because) it is detached
from a correspondent structural transformation on the control of property and market
relations, which are the material forms of domination – and the most tangible ones.3
Populism makes all the more ambiguous who controls politics, who expresses their will,
who drives the political project, who has agency, who holds power, who beneﬁts and who
loses. This political ambiguity, with a clear class connotation, forms the backbone of populist
politics. As the term ‘populism’ indicates, this ambiguity is deﬁned in relation to, and from
the perspective of, the working class, which is both an agent of the state’s political empow-
erment and a recipient of the state’s political decisions. Populism does not enhance
2For Laclau (1977), socialist ideology is populist in nature. ‘Socialist populism’, therefore, is not backward, but rather the
most advanced form of ‘populism of the dominated’.
3In the case of progressive and possibly emancipatory politics, the political project, its practice and eﬀects cohere – the
antagonism is found in the very class struggle, transforming social and power relations.
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working-class agency and decision-making power, nor does it guarantee economic democ-
racy or lead to social emancipation, even though this might appear to be the case.
Grasping the populist fetish requires two levels of analysis. One describes how a leader,
social groups and the political agenda are perceived (as ‘the people’ against ‘the elite’, for
example), and how their relationships, actions and political capacities are shaped as a
result. Most descriptions and analyses of populism do just that, which is not unimportant;
populism is about perceptions driving political outcomes and playing a key role in the
battle for power. A judicious investigation, however, should take a second analytical
step to disclose the relationship between the way reality is perceived and the way it is
in essence – a task to which a Marxist political economy analysis is devoted (see Fine
and Saad-Filho 2016, 4). The analysis should reveal how subjective, fetishized political
relationships, such as those among ‘the people’ or between them and the state and its
leaders, correspond objectively as social class relations. Assuming a macro perspective,
this article explores broad class relations constituted and conditioned by a state-spon-
sored pattern of accumulation and development.
2003–2006: the making of a leader of the poor
Brazil, a country for all
(2002 electoral campaign slogan)
Lula contested three presidential elections as a candidate for the PT before he was suc-
cessful in 2002. Between his ﬁrst electoral campaign in 1989 and his ﬁrst term of oﬃce,
Brazil underwent two mutually reinforcing and constituting transitions (Saad-Filho 2010,
24). The ﬁrst was a political transition from 20 years of military dictatorship to an era of
representative democracy. The second was an economic transition from developmental-
ism, supported by Import Substitution Industrialization (ISI) policies, to neoliberalism,
underpinned by policy and institutional reforms in the early 1990s.
A combination of high interest rates, an overvalued currency, ﬁscal austerity measures,
the privatization of public assets, open trade and capital borders – the cornerstones of the
1990s reforms – transformed the patterns of production, capital accumulation and labor
reproduction in the country through a fast-advancing ﬁnancialization process. The
national industrial sector, once the pillar of the developmentalist model, was signiﬁcantly
harmed and with it the industrial workforce; more than two million salaried posts were lost
between 1989 and 1999 in the industrial sector alone (Oliveira 2006, 11). In addition to this
development, wages depreciated and labor rights were relaxed. As Saad-Filho (2010)
remarks, democracy facilitated and legitimized economic changes that fragmented the
labor force, repressed trade union activities and increased economic insecurity while creat-
ing the conditions for capital accumulation through the expansion and intensiﬁcation of
ﬁnancial transactions that transferred income (and power) to the ﬁnancial system.4
The new development pattern produced ﬁve years of macroeconomic stability and
consumption-led growth (1993–1997), followed by ﬁve years of multiple crises and a
recession (1998–2002), including a balance of payments crisis, currency collapse, the
4Saad-Filho (2010, 24) argues that democracy was established as ‘the political form of neoliberalism in Brazil’. From 1989
onwards, the control and coercion of the working class become ‘primarily “economic” rather than “political”, as was the
case under the dictatorship’ (Saad-Filho 2010).
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return of inﬂation, further job cuts and the deterioration of public services. Lula obtained
his ﬁrst electoral triumph on the backdrop of crises – largely blamed on Cardoso’s govern-
ment. His electoral victory also reﬂected the PT’s historical representation of the organized
working class struggles, as well as contestations of the neoliberal ruling order.5
Lula was elected after securing 61.3% of the vote in the second (runoﬀ) voting round,
after having won 46.5% in the ﬁrst. His votes originated from the social sectors most
aﬀected by the neoliberal ﬁnancialization process. This group of voters, which Saad-
Filho and Morais (2018, 109–113) refer to as an ‘alliance of losers’, was composed of the
unionized working class (rural and urban), civil servants, sections of the middle-class popu-
lation and members of the business community (Saad-Filho and Morais 2018). They were
predominantly educated, had higher levels of income, and resided in the most urbanized
and industrialized states in the South and Southeast regions (Hunter and Power 2007, 4).
Although his election was celebrated as signifying the long-awaited ‘rise of the left’,
Lula’s electoral campaign showed that the PT no longer had the same political and ideo-
logical character of the past. The party had toned down its political discourse and adopted
a non-confrontational spirit, encapsulated in its all-embracing ‘Brazil for all’ campaign
slogan and in Lula’s self-designation as the candidate of ‘peace and love’. The party also
allied with a center-right party, from which an industrial businessperson was handpicked
for the post of vice president. In addition, near the campaign’s ﬁnal stage, Lula addressed
the Brazilian people in a letter in which he vowed, if elected, to maintain the orthodox
macroeconomic policies of his predecessor – a move considered both pragmatic and pol-
itically opportunistic.
Preceding the election, the Brazilian economy was on the verge of collapse, provoked
by massive capital ﬂight and domestic currency devaluation. Lula’s letter was written in an
attempt to appease nervous foreign investors – and the market in general – alarmed by his
imminent election. It also served to gain the sympathy of more conservative constituents
who had never voted for the PT. As Anderson (2011) noted, Lula had understood that ‘it
was not just builders and bankers who needed reassurance that he would not do anything
unduly radical in power, but – even more crucially – street vendors and slum-dwellers too’.
In brief, Lula’s campaign had an ambiguous political identity. Despite creating a
glimmer of hope that improvements and political change would follow, it also produced
a sense of political disenchantment and skepticism among the radical left and the PT’s
most politicized base. It was clear that the party had no mandate to carry on the structural
changes that once formed its political agenda (Saad-Filho and Morais 2018, 116–117).
In January 2003, when Lula took oﬃce, the country was in disarray. Unexpectedly,
however, by the end of his ﬁrst year on the job, he had managed to stabilize the
economy. From there, he continued to make steady gains throughout his term of oﬃce.
In 2006, the year in which Lula was reelected, the country seemed to be ready to ‘take
oﬀ’ – the Brazilian miracle was within reach!
Before understanding the basis for and the reach of his administration’s economic and
social achievements, the next section examines the appeal these achievements have
eﬀected – perhaps Lula’s most signiﬁcant political feat.
5Together with the Workers’ Central Union (Central Única dos Trabalhadores, CUT), the PT has fought against ‘privatizations,
outsourcing and the managerial state model. At the same time, they have defended the universalization of public social
policies and the state’s responsibility to meet social needs’ (Sitcovsky 2013, 119, author’s translation).
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Lulism
Lula again, with the power of the people
(2006 electoral campaign slogan)
In 2006, Lula was reelected with 61% of the vote in the second voting round (having
secured 48.6% in the ﬁrst), thereby practically replicating the outcome of the 2002 elec-
tions. Yet the overall electoral result concealed a phenomenon that Brazilian intellectual
André Singer termed ‘Lulism’: Lula’s rise as a ‘leader of the poor’. Lula was rejected by
his previous electorate, but was reappointed as president by the vote of a new constitu-
ency with very diﬀerent social features.6
Lula’s new supporters included the internal bourgeoisie but especially the low and very
low-income strata, beneﬁciaries of the social policies of his ﬁrst mandate. This time, his
constituency formed an ‘alliance of winners’ (Saad-Filho and Morais 2018, 126). The
majority of Lula’s voters encompassed a social category that Singer (2009) called the
‘sub-proletariat’7; they represented the Brazilian workforce majority since the period of
neoliberal restructuring (Oliveira 2006, 11), consisting of mainly informal (irregular and
unskilled) workers associated with precarious working conditions and poor remuneration
– the working poor. These voters came from rural areas and overwhelmingly from the
North and Northeast regions of the country.
For the ﬁrst time in Brazilian history, the very poor voted for a candidate representing
the left (Singer 2009, 90). Singer’s explanation of the change in the voting pattern of the
sub-proletariat is important to this article’s argument. For him, this change reﬂected two
characteristics of this social stratum that were met by Lula’s inaugural legacy. First, given
their poverty, this group had an objective and pressing need for material and social
change. Second, and paradoxically, the sub-proletariat, even though desiring change,
had a conservative political and moral ethos. Diﬀering from the formal working class,
these workers had no protection from unions or their own forms of labor organization,
and had little capacity to build it from below (Singer 2009, 87–88); consequently, they
were the most aﬀected by strikes or social unrest, for example. As a result, this materially
and socially vulnerable group desired change, but largely expected it without political con-
frontations or social distress. In fact, given their lack of social and political organization,
they relied on the state to realize change and provide protection. In the 2006 election,
they identiﬁed Lula as the leader of such a state who would tackle poverty and inequality
without breaking from the established order.
As mentioned above, the PT adopted a non-confrontational strategy in the 2002 cam-
paign, renouncing its radical leftist identity and moderating its discourse and political
program. Singer (2009, 99) suggests that, unable to mobilize and shape the sub-proletariat
6The loss of the previous electorate’s support is partially explained by the so-called ‘mensalão’ corruption scandal that
erupted in 2005. Oliveira (2006, 5) also reminds us that, although voting is compulsory in Brazil, 31% of the electorate
either did not vote or cast blank or null votes – the highest rate of electoral indiﬀerence in Brazil’s democratic history.
7Singer adopts the deﬁnition of his father, Paul Singer, arguing that the sub-proletariat is a social category that sells its labor
power below what is necessary for social reproduction under normal conditions. As survival strategies, this highly het-
erogeneous group relies on occasional wage work, informal exchange, opportunistic engagement with the economy,
state transfers, charity and crime (Saad-Filho and Morais 2018, 196). These authors called them the informal working
class, which is the preferable term. The authors also remark that, since the advent of neoliberalism, the dividing line
between the informal and formal working class has become increasingly blurred. In parts of the text, I chose to use
the ‘working poor’ because it alludes to both class and the conditions of social reproduction.
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through a Left debate and action, Lula transformed them into a political actor by shaping
his discourse and political program to their conservatism.
Lula succeeded in achieving economic stability, which was particularly important to the
informal, non-unionized workers. But unlike all previous governments, he was able to sub-
stantially improve the quality of life of the very poor, particularly by increasing their pur-
chasing power. Such an accomplishment resulted from not only the cash transfer program,
the Bolsa Família, but also the 24.25% real increase in the minimum wage during his ﬁrst
presidential term (Singer 2009, 92), which strongly impacted the income of families who
were relying exclusively on the pension of an elderly household member. Lula’s social pol-
icies also included the provision of popular credits, support to family farmers, housing, and
electricity to remote areas, among others, which altogether enabled an increase in popular
consumption, an expansion of the domestic market and the creation of more employment
opportunities. His welfare policies were material evidence of his intention and ability to
put in place a transformative agenda beneﬁting the poor (thus serving as a powerful
basis for support).
Reaching the poor population through federal programs, Lula delivered a symbolic
message: ‘the state [or Lula] cares for the lot of every Brazilian, no matter how wretched
or downtrodden, as citizens with social rights in their country’ (Anderson 2011). As Ander-
son stresses, the image of a caretaker of the poor became Lula’s ‘most unshakeable pol-
itical asset’ (Anderson 2011). Bolsa Família, despite being managed impersonally – and
thus contrasting with the kind of clientelism characteristic of classic populism (Anderson
2011) – had ‘immediate and palpable eﬀects on the president’s political fortunes’ (Hunter
and Power 2007, 25). Other social programs, Oliveira (2006, 19) argues, were so poorly
managed that they achieved virtually nothing besides reaﬃrming Lula’s strong leadership
and caring image.
Singer argues that Lula established an ideological bridge with the conservative sub-pro-
letariat by succeeding in assisting them only by pursuing a weak reformist agenda.8
Without denying the signiﬁcance of improved material conditions for vulnerable people
under Lula’s rule, it is necessary to highlight the emergence of an equally important devel-
opment: the fetishization of Lula as a representative of the poor. Lula came to embody
popular hopes and under his leadership created a sense among the working poor that
they had become the main social force in power.
Lula had the same social background as his supporters and incorporated the poor’s
culture and language. In the past, this was not an asset for him but it became so after
his ﬁrst successful term in oﬃce. His personal history as a humble, northeastern,
working-class migrant began to aﬀect people’s self-esteem, already suggesting an emer-
ging fetish around ‘President Lula’ (as he is still called today). Such a dynamic increased his
credibility as ‘the champion of the poor’, while expanding his government’s legitimacy.
Anderson (2011) remarks that Lula’s direct relationship with the masses prevented the
media from shaping the political undercurrent in the country, as it had been able to do in
the past, when framing Collor as ‘the ‘Maharajas’ hunter’ during the 1989 presidential cam-
paign, or Cardoso as the ‘inﬂation tamer’ during the 1994 and 1998 campaigns. The 2006
8Singer’s thesis is sophisticated and nuanced. In this article, it is not presented or endorsed in its entirety. ‘Lulism’ has pro-
voked considerable academic repercussions in Brazil, which this article also reﬂects on only partially. What I focus on here
is the electoral realignment phenomenon and the inception of Lula’s leadership over the masses, both of which Singer
pointed out and oﬀered convincing historical and contextual explanations for.
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election revealed an eﬀective loss of the political power of the media while the masses
assumed a protagonist role by eﬀecting political power through voting based on their con-
nection to Lula, not only giving him a second mandate, but also allowing the PT to remain
in power for two subsequent elections.
Lulism and populism
According to de la Torre, ‘[l]eft-wing populists emerged [in Latin America] as a result of
widespread popular resistance to neoliberalism’ (2016, 63–64). While it holds that the
PT came to power as a result of discontent over the eﬀects of neoliberal reforms, Lula’s
leadership of the marginal masses emerged despite, if not because of, his compliance
with the (neoliberal) order. Furthermore, it is precisely the working class disorganization
and depoliticization, both deepened by neoliberalism, that together form one of the
pillars of Lulism. In Filgueiras’ words (2013, 388), Lulism did not originate only as a
result of Lula’s poverty alleviation policies; more importantly, it reﬂected the identiﬁcation
of Lula as a representative of those fragmented and disorganized social segments that
could not express themselves autonomously and independently in the political arena.
Paradoxically, the rise of Lula (and the PT) to power manifested the disempowerment
and disorganization of Lula’s own class (Oliveira 2006, 11). Even though Lula maintained
an organized and critical electoral base – the MST, for example, was part of it – it was
insigniﬁcant in size.
Contrary to Laclau’s idea that ‘there is no populism without discursive construction of
an enemy’ (Laclau 2005, 39), Lula united the electorate using a social conciliation dis-
course. This does not invalidate the hypothesis of populism, but rather points to the
limits of empiricism found in the literature. If Singer is right, social conciliation allowed
for the expression of an ideological unity with the working poor, just as an antagonistic
discourse could in a diﬀerent context. Furthermore, in a deeply divided and unjust
society such as that of Brazil, social conciliation is no less fetishized than many forms of
‘us-and-them’ divides.
Lula realized, however, that social conciliation served to aggregate the masses but not
to win the elites’ trust. Oliveira (2006, 6) stresses that in Lula’s ﬁrst interview after his
second electoral victory, he ‘complained bitterly of not being the choice of the rich, point-
ing out that bankers have never earned so much money as under his government’. Lula
was right, but chose to frame his election as ‘a victory of the poor’. The media sub-
sequently fueled the polarization of the rich and the poor. Of course, the dichotomy
was ﬁgurative. First, Oliveira (2007) notes that the other half of the electorate was not com-
posed of only the rich. Second, as Lula’s statement informs, his administration was not
(and not even primarily) supporting only the poor; thus, his election was also a victory
of the rich. This, however, remained invisible.
The polarization of rich and poor bears relations with class conﬂict, but cannot be
equated to class struggle (Singer 2013). According to Singer, ‘the success of Lulism
involved a social solution from above, creating both a depolarization [of capital and
labor] and a repolarization [of rich and poor] politics’ (Singer 2012, 157 as quoted in Fil-
gueiras 2013, 388, author’s translation).
Although Singer would agree that Lulism incorporates several elements of populism,
for him, the PT political project was a genuine and complete project of the sub-proletariat
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with a conservative ethos, that is, an authentic representation of the working poor, able to
respond to their needs. In Singer’s view, there is no fetish. For him, Lulism could be con-
sidered as the politics of the sub-proletariat, even if they only attempted to reconcile with
those of the bourgeoisie. In Singer’s thesis, Lulism was a successful model in arbitrating the
interests of the two essential classes: the bourgeoisie and the proletariat (see Boito 2013).
This, however, is problematic. First, Singer seems to disregard the asymmetries in the
power relations between the two essential classes, as noted by Boito (2013). Second, to
infer that the PT executed the political project of the sub-proletariat, it is necessary to
look at the state’s overall politics. This helps to identify where and how the policies
aimed at the poor’s interests were articulated – and made sense – economically and pol-
itically, as part of a broader social context. This is what the next sections examine.
Disclosing the economic basis of the PT’s political project
The combating of poverty and social inequality without social confrontation – the basis of
Lula’s ideological and social project – meant, in practice, having an economic project with
two legs: one developmentalist, the other neoliberal. The latter was a continuation of Car-
doso’s prescription, whereas the former represented the novelty of the PT’s strategy.
Organic intellectuals of the party (see Pochmann or Sader in Sader 2013) have called
the political project ‘neo-developmentalist’, defending the advancement of a post-neolib-
eral pattern of development in the country despite the maintenance of the neoliberal
macroeconomic orthodoxy. In Sampaio Jr.’s critical view, the PT’s neo-developmentalist
project intended to
reconcile the ‘positive’ aspects of neoliberalism – unconditional commitment to currency stab-
ility, ﬁscal austerity, the search for international competitiveness, the absence of any kind of
discrimination against international capital – with the ‘positive’ aspects of the old develop-
mentalism – commitment to economic growth, industrialization, the regulatory role of the
state and social sensitivity. (2012, 679, author’s translation)
However, if the combat of social inequality within the established order were two political
agendas that did not seem to combine (Singer 2009, 96), developmentalism and neoliber-
alism were two policy prescriptions that, together, seemed unsustainable, either from the
mainstream perspective or from the neo-developmentalist heterodoxy (Morais and Saad-
Filho 2011, 523). On the one hand, neoliberal macroeconomic policies impose real limits
on growth, industrial competitiveness, public investment, social welfare and state activism,
all of which are promoted and expected under developmental policies. On the other hand,
the expansion of domestic consumption, imports and public spending, which develop-
mentalism promotes, deteriorate the current account balance, primary ﬁscal surplus and
inﬂation control, thereby undermining the macroeconomic stability brought about by
orthodox policies.
Within the political sphere, developmentalist and neoliberal economic policies were
accompanied by a tension between a productivist and a rentier social coalition. The pro-
ductivist coalition agenda included the control of foreign capital ﬂows, interest rate
reduction, domestic currency devaluation, protection of the industry against the ‘Dutch
disease’ and deindustrialization, an increase in public investments in infrastructure and
a reduction in inequality (Filgueiras 2013). The rentier coalition, in turn, advocated high
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interest rates, the free ﬂow of foreign capital, a ﬂoating exchange rate, central bank inde-
pendence and the rejection of state-led income redistribution.
Despite this tense economic and political arrangement, Brazil started to experience an
economic upswing, followed by social improvements that were visible during Lula’s ﬁrst
term in oﬃce. In December 2010, Lula ended his presidential term with an unprecedented
popularity level of around 90%. How was he able to reconcile the irreconcilable?
Agricultural exports have a prominent and revealing political role in answering this
question. The next section shows that there was no leadership miracle.
Agribusiness and the commodity boom: a political windfall
Agricultural export was critical in lifting the economy out of the stagnation and crisis it
faced in the early 2000s. At the end of Lula’s ﬁrst year as president, the agribusiness
trade surplus had oﬀset the country’s current account deﬁcit, ending the period of macro-
economic instability and producing the ﬁrst growth cycle, both having a substantial pol-
itical eﬀect for Lula and the PT. Lula thus reaped the political fruits of a convergence of
domestic and international factors.
The productivity increase in the agricultural export sector, which reﬂected the techno-
logical advancement stimulated during Cardoso’s last administration, resulted in sizable
soya harvests that were traded on the international market not only at exceptional
prices, but also under the condition of strong domestic currency devaluation, thereby gen-
erating extra revenue. Brazil was in crisis when Lula ﬁrst came to power, but was ready to
feed into and beneﬁt from the global commodity super-cycle driven by emerging markets,
particularly China.
Over the course of one year, from 2003 to 2004, the annual GDP growth rate increased
from 1.1% to 5.8%, and by the end of 2005, Brazil was experiencing a growth cycle driven
mainly by (agricultural) exports (Carvalho 2018). According to Loureiro (2019, 5), between
2003 and 2005, exports corresponded to 42.7% of the rise in aggregate demand against
39.5% and 4.5% of private consumption and investment, respectively.
This externally-driven growth cycle during Lula’s ﬁrst administration unleashed a series of
processes that led to a second and virtuous growth cycle with very diﬀerent characteristics
(Loureiro 2019). Together with macroeconomic stabilization and lower inﬂation, the ﬁrst
growth wave helped to recover the average real salary after mid-2004 (Filgueiras 2013,
398), stimulating an increase in domestic consumption. The extraordinary trade balance sur-
pluses mentioned above stimulated the return of foreign investors to the economy. With
investments, production, trade and consumption on the rise, the ﬁscal budget increased,
allowing for the expansion of income redistribution programs and public investments,
both of which have an impact on employment opportunities. The improvement in employ-
ment and income – through income transfer programs, a minimum wage increase and
access to popular credit – further stimulated an increase in consumption. From 2006 to
2012, economic growth was domestically driven, mainly by domestic consumption and
investment (Loureiro 2019). Yet this second pattern of growth was not detached from, but
rather reinforced by, and partly reliant on, the commodity export sectors.
Several authors claim that the second growth cycle resulted from a state-led policy
inﬂection (Barbosa and Souza 2010) or policy hybridization (Morais and Saad-Filho
2011) characterized by state activism in relaxing macroeconomic policies and pushing
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forward developmental policies. Politically, the inﬂection meant alleviating the tensions
between the productive and rentier bourgeoisies while beneﬁting the poor. The extraordi-
nary performance of agricultural exports – this time together with the extractive industry
(oil, mining and gas) – partly explains the temporary lift of the policy incompatibility within
the PT’s political formula. Such a role became evident and possible during Lula’s mandates,
when commodity prices and international liquidity were exceptional – two contingent and
exogenous factors to the national economy.
Carvalho (2018) mentions that the rise in international commodity prices not only
increased incentives and resources for investments in the commodity-producing
sectors, but also engendered a chain eﬀect for the related sectors, raising government rev-
enues needed for the expansion of public investments. The massive inﬂow of foreign
investment during this period responded to the opportunities in the agricultural sector,
the extractive industry and related infrastructure (Gonçalves 2012, 13) – besides the oppor-
tunities arising from Brazil’s large domestic market.
Many of the investments of the Growth Acceleration Program (PAC), a state investment
platform launched in 2006, were also induced by the commodity production sectors. The
PAC became a dynamic center of growth in subsequent years (Sitcovsky 2013, 120). Other
state initiatives, such as the provision of subsidized loans from the National Development
Bank (BNDES) to national corporations, or South-South investments and partnerships, tar-
geted and boosted the primary sector.
The evolution of employment in this period occurred at the base of the Brazilian social
pyramid, corresponding to the labor-intensive, low-paid and low-skilled sectors that were
driving economic growth, in particular, the service sector, construction and extractive
industries (Pochmann 2012). It is important to note that the salary gains, particularly in
the service sector, were transferred to the ﬁnal service costs, resulting in service price
inﬂation (Carvalho 2018). It was only possible to increase income (and consumption) at
the base of the pyramid and to retain overall control of inﬂation because primary com-
modity exports and foreign investment (both generating a massive inﬂow of foreign cur-
rency) induced exchange rate appreciation (Carvalho 2018). This cheapened imports and
prevented price readjustments in the sectors that, unlike services, faced international com-
petition, thereby enabling inﬂation targets to be met.
Allowing the exchange rate to ﬂuctuate according to market forces was a political
choice that had several eﬀects on the patterns of production and trade. While the
steady appreciation of domestic currency favored the assemblers of imported industrial
inputs, it undermined the internal and external competitiveness of several branches of
the national industry. This implied that the increase in domestic consumption (as a
driver of growth) was linked to the development of a growing industrial trade deﬁcit. In
the mid-2000s, this perverse dynamic could continue, since the trade surpluses of the
primary commodity sector compensated for the industrial trade deﬁcit. The primary
sector, which exploits cheap and abundant production factors, was highly competitive,
regardless of the exchange rate overvaluation.
Maintaining high interest rates was also a political choice that produced unequal and
conﬂicting eﬀects between the productive and rentier bourgeoisie, as well as society at
large. It increased the cost of bank credit operations and undermined the domestic
capacity of private investments. While some businesses perished, corporate ﬁnancialized
industries (several in agribusiness itself) could expand, relying on external ﬁnancing, either
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through intercompany loans, buying and selling equity stakes, or borrowing abroad at
favorable rates. The state itself could increasingly rely on external ﬁnancing, selling
public debt bonds with very attractive interest rates leveraged by the Central Bank bench-
mark rate. In a moment of expansion of the global economy, Brazil became a hub of
foreign investment and ﬁnancial transactions.
That meant that, besides oﬀsetting the industrial trade deﬁcit, primary exports were
also remunerating the stocks of foreign capital, both perversely enhanced as a conse-
quence of the growth model (Andrade 2016). Primary exports prevented an immediate
erosion of the balance of payments (BoP), public accounts and inﬂation control (Filgueiras
2013, 37; Carvalho 2018). Therefore, these exports helped to sustain the economic policy
inﬂection that promoted growth leveraged by investment and domestic consumption
while maintaining high interest rates, currency overvaluation and a contractionary ﬁscal
policy.
In this particular international context, primary commodity production and exports
helped the state promote a concrete, albeit temporary and limited reversal between the
neoliberal and neo-developmentalist policy eﬀects on the economy and society, letting
the latter stand out – the material basis of Lulism. However, they did not help transform
the power asymmetries between the two essential classes in state decision-making, nor
did they transform the inequalities in economic and social relations, which form the
abstract basis supporting the argument for populism and the fetish of the neo-develop-
mentalist project. The performance of the primary commodity sectors reinforced, dee-
pened, sustained and concealed its structural vulnerabilities and dependencies, which
are discussed in the next section.
The development pattern and social relations: deceiving the class
mandate received at the polls
The pattern of economic growth and development contributed to the deterioration of the
commodities –manufacture composition of the country’s trade balance (Morais and Saad-
Filho 2011, 523) and enhanced a regressive primary specialization trend in the inter-
national division of labor. As the productive structure became less diversiﬁed and inte-
grated, reﬂecting the dismantling of industrial chains since the 1990s, the country
entered a fragile path of international market dependence and reliance on exchange
rate overvaluation. Depreciating the real would make imported products (on which the
country came to depend) more expensive, advancing instead of relieving the negative
eﬀects on the trade balance, consumer prices and inﬂation – all of which came to be
experienced soon after the end of the commodity boom.
The macroeconomic policies mentioned above stimulated a massive, state-operated
transfer of public income – leveraged by the eﬀects of growth on the ﬁscal budget – to
the private sphere of national and international owners of ﬁnancial assets (Carvalho
2018). In this way, the state limited its capacity to invest and redistribute. The increase
of domestic assets owned by foreigners (e.g. state- and private-owned enterprises and ser-
vices, bonds of public debt, private equity stakes) created a corresponding intensiﬁcation
of income and proﬁt repatriation, or a draining of income and capital. The exchange rate
overvaluation further stimulated remittances and foreign speculative investment
(Andrade 2016, 11) by increasing their real return when converted back to hard currency.
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The patterns and intensity of ﬁnancial transactions between residents and nonresidents of
the country placed a structural burden on the current account of the BoP.
The policy inﬂection at the basis of the neo-developmentalist project was fragile,
depending on and nurturing itself through the primary sector and foreign investment,
both contingent to the international context. It was also weak: the economic model was
structurally inadequate for attaching domestic demand dynamism to a corresponding
industrial, technological dynamism, as well as for linking the ﬁscal gains to a correspond-
ing expansion in public investment and social redistribution. It promoted a limited conver-
gence of class interests within the bourgeoisie, as well as within the working class, shaped
by the constraints of monetary policies and ﬁnancial dominance.
Instead of neo-developmentalism, the PT promoted a ‘reverse developmentalism’ (Gon-
çalves 2012). The structural axis of the (old) national developmentalism had been inverted,
inducing a reprimarization of exports, de-industrialization and the import of industrial
goods (literally the reversal of import substitution), greater technological dependence
and denationalization, a loss of international competitiveness and greater external struc-
tural vulnerability – making the Brazilian economy prone to crises (Gonçalves 2012).
Diﬀerent from the ﬁrst years of the 2000s, agribusiness exports were no longer a con-
tingent element that helped lift the country out of crisis and launch a neo-developmen-
talist experience. Agribusiness for exports became endogenous to the state-sponsored
pattern of accumulation and integral to the regressive structures of production, trade, con-
sumption and ﬁnance. Vergara-Camus and Kay (2017) pointed to the inability of left-
leaning governments in Latin America to confront agribusiness power and deal with
the state’s rentier character. In the case of Brazil, it was not a matter of the government’s
inability, but rather its direct economic and political reliance on agribusiness and the
extractive industry for sustaining its political project.
To avoid these ﬂaws, the entire macroeconomic policy framework would have to
change, with a corresponding demise of the rentier coalition’s ascendance in policy-
making. As Filgueiras and Gonçalves sharply note,
[… ] the interest rate in Brazil is not only the classical instrument of monetary policy; it is much
more than that. [… ] it constitutes the fundamental element that structures and at the same
time expresses class and power relations. (2007, 180, author’s translation)
The patterns of employment creation, earned income distribution and consumption pro-
moted in this period beneﬁted the very poor, albeit at the margins. These patterns also
created a (dangerous) double squeeze on the urban middle class and part of the formal
proletariat, which was still signiﬁcantly poor. The latter were users of public services
(e.g. health, transport, education), which worsened in terms of quality, cost and service
capacity, whereas the former were users of urban services (e.g. restaurants, hairdressers,
domestic services, construction) aﬀected by the price inﬂation resulting from the increase
in labor costs. The middle class also experienced a decline in the availability of formal (and
better remunerated) employment opportunities. In brief, the neo-developmentalist
project increased tensions within the broad working class (while easing those within
the bourgeoisie) (Filgueiras and Gonçalves 2007).
Finally, it is important to remember that the income redistribution did not reach the top
of the pyramid. It is worth looking at the fostered pattern of asset ownership. Land and
natural resource assets, which have a historically narrow basis, became even more
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concentrated after the 2000s. Comparing land distribution patterns, Teixeira (2011) shows
that, between 2003 and 2010, large properties increased by 16% in number and 48.4% in
size: an additional 104 million hectares of private property, 70% of which is found in the
Amazon region. In 2003, large properties corresponded to 51.6% of the country’s total rural
property area, compared with 56.1% in 2010; all other property size groupings reduced
their share of the total property area.
Concentration also marks the pattern of ﬁnancial asset ownership. Consequently,
several authors have questioned the assertion over decreasing inequality and poverty
rates in Brazil (Oliveira 2009; Sitcovsky 2013, 134):
[… ] the mere payment of the domestic debt service, around 200 billion reais per year, against
the extremely modest 10 to 15 billion of Bolsa Família, does not require much theoretical
speculation to conclude that inequality is increasing. (Oliveira 2009, author’s translation)
Amann and Baer (2012, 420) have asked ‘whether further substantial improvements in
the distribution of income can be realized in the context of a highly skewed pattern of
asset ownership’. Indeed, this brings into question the forms and eﬀectiveness of
income redistribution, including cash transfer programs and other social policies, all of
which were deﬁnitive to the success of the PT in presidential elections. The next section
brieﬂy exempliﬁes how these tensions touched upon the countryside.
The rural staging political tensions and appeasements
In December 2010, the Institute of Agrarian Reform (INCRA) presented statistics showing
that, during Lula’s terms in oﬃce, the Agrarian Reform Program reached its best ever per-
formance in regard to designated area and number of settled families. The well-known
scholar Ariovaldo U. de Oliveira contested the statistics, explaining that INCRA aggregated
land titling and land regularization with the expropriation and implementation of new
settlements. According to his calculations, only 34.4% of the total number of land settle-
ments documented by INCRA between 2003 and 2009 were truly new settlements (Arruda
2011). And in 2011, under Rousseﬀ’s administration, the number of settled families
reached the lowest point in 16 years (Pericás 2017, 61).
By contrast, the volume of public resources Lula and Rousseﬀ spent on the ‘family
farm’ agricultural sector was without precedent – although signiﬁcantly lower than the
volume spent in large-scale, highly capitalized agriculture – and had an impact on
rural income and productivity. The rural credit program (Pronaf) mostly beneﬁted the
better-oﬀ (small-scale) producers, while programs such as the food procurement
program (PAA) or targeted credit for women and youth beneﬁted poorer producers
(Sabourin 2007), including most of the beneﬁciaries of agrarian reform. The number of
rural poor decreased by 38.7% between 2003 and 2009 (author’s calculation based on
DIEESE 2011, 143).
For the MST leadership, agrarian reform itself became a sort of social compensation
policy during the mandates of the PT. Mafort (2018, 19), who is part of that leadership,
argues that the consolidation of family agriculture occurred at the expense of structural
and transformative agrarian reform, class consciousness formation and movement-build-
ing. Agrarian reform, which once formed the core of the PT’s political project, assumed a
diﬀerent nature during the party’s mandate, as did the social struggle for land.
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Pericás (2017) presents other interesting ﬁgures covering the period in which the econ-
omic crisis commenced. In 2012, 70% of the budget allocated to INCRA was cut. During the
same period, 42.9% of land reform settlers had abandoned their land, and 35% had illeg-
ally transferred their property (Pericás 2017, 60–61). At the start of 2013, 36% of the
families in land reform settlement schemes depended on the Bolsa Família (Pericás
2017, 59–60). Unsurprisingly, authors such as Filgueiras and Gonçalves (2007) argued
that several of Lula’s social policies were unable to disarm the structural mechanisms of
poverty reproduction. Maintaining the poor in a permanent state of insecurity and depen-
dence, they only functioned as a buﬀer of social tensions within a liberal project or instru-
ments of political manipulation (Pericás 2017). In the countryside, many programs simply
mitigated a state-sponsored erosion of rural social reproduction.
The MST remained critical of the government and politically active during the entire
period, but could not escape the eﬀects of populism on its base, which, on the one
hand, was at the forefront of the conﬂict related to agribusiness expansion, and, on the
other, was beneﬁting from several social and income policies. Both dynamics were
linked and promoted by the government. The movement was put into a deadlock: struc-
tural agrarian reform, its main demand, did not make sense in the PT development model
and advanced very little; as a result, the movement lost the power of mobilization. The
MST remained politically engaged, but became less eﬀective. To a certain extent,
placing more emphasis on the economic-corporate demands of its landed base, which
were partly met by public programs, the movement became dependent on Lulism
(Almeida 2012) – even if there was a sharp understanding and critique of the development
model, its logic and corresponding powers among its ranks.
The irony of Lula’s political project in rural areas was having the state capacity to redis-
tribute income, expand credit and other forms of support to the rural working poor tied to
the encroachment of capital (and thus, to its legitimacy) on land and natural resources.
This signiﬁes that, beyond concessions to the rural poor, social welfare was part and
parcel of a vicious social alliance between the poor and the dominant capital – an alliance
that deepened structural class contradictions.
Tackling poverty and social inequality were rendered exogenous to capital-labor
relations and to the dynamics of income and wealth accumulation that bring them into
being. Social programs, such as Bolsa Família, could be presented as administrative sol-
utions (with a temporary, immediatist, selective and assistentialist nature), depoliticizing
both poverty and inequality (Oliveira 2006, 22). As Sitcovsky observed,
[t]he intellectuals of the Workers’ Party, by presenting the thesis of post-neoliberalism, neo-
developmentalism, and arguing for a virtuous growth cycle, [… ] created a mystifying
[perhaps, fetishized] vision of reality, covering up reprimarization, deindustrialization and
the deepening of ﬁnancialization. Likewise, by declaring the end of extreme poverty
through Bolsa Família, and reducing the social phenomenon of poverty to an income issue,
they eventually reiﬁed it. (2013, 135, author’s translation)
The next section resumes the discussion on populism and elaborates on Lula’s model.
A new modality of left-wing populism: drawing from above and below
I am no longer a human being; I am an idea – an idea fused with yours
(Lula’s statement on the day of his arrest, 7 April 2018)
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Lula’s model of populism is not easy to grasp – it is nuanced. Simple labels fall short in
describing, much less analyzing it. Lula and the PT are associated with the left, whose poli-
tics is inspired by a critique of capitalism and a corresponding alternative vision. Concerns
with poverty, employment, income and working class mobilization have been constitutive
of leftist politics. Yet ‘populism of the left’ does not adequately describe the PT experience
in power.
The populism of the left is historically associated with the fetishization of patterns of
accumulation from below in which the rural economy assumes central importance. This
type of populism is marked by the pursuit of economic and social policies that assume
inherent properties of small-scale property and production, family labor, local culture,
rural development and nationalism as the bases for social justice, equity, autonomy
(rural or national), sovereignty and emancipation. The fetish lies in the fact that none of
these – the scale, the family, the locality, the territory or the nation – relate to the
causes of capitalist exploitation, poverty or inequality (see Byres 1979; Kitching 1989;
and Brass 2000). Consequently, populism from below, even if having a sophisticated pol-
itical agenda, fails to describe in theory, and to resolve in practice, how forms of (petit com-
modity, national) production and accumulation are integrated into broader capitalist and
international commodity relations. Their politics fail ‘the people’, in part or in total, leaving
unrestrained forms of capitalist exploitation, which in theory they oppose (Kitching 1989,
181–3).
Yet it is likely that populism from below is economically more democratic, mobilizes the
grassroots, has a leader that comes from below and calls upon or urges the people to act,
rallies supporters, bends the economic elite and so on. However, these and other features
should not be inferred theoretically, but rather described empirically. In contemporary
Latin America, perhaps Morales in Bolivia could be better described as a leader embodying
populism from below. Other examples can be found in the African context, such as Tan-
zania under Nyerere’s rule, where the widespread access to and dependence on land
for social reproduction made accumulation from below conceivable as a political project.
Lula’s personal history and the social characteristics of the population he mobilized
created a sense of a government ‘for and from below’. Lula promoted personal ties
with the poor, but also catered to their real interests, enabling income redistribution
that is a progressive and popular demand. This has been crucial to the way in which
Lula and the PT secured and exerted power. However, Lula did not try to implement a
model of accumulation from below. His populism therefore belongs to a new modality
of populism of the left.
Lula did not attempt to dispute control over the (re)organization of property, pro-
duction, appropriation and accumulation within society. In his government, the dominant
classes (e.g. banks, ﬁnanciers, multinational corporations, national and international
holders of public debt bonds) beneﬁted from structural macroeconomic policies, while
the working class beneﬁted from income redistribution measures with essential limits in
scope, scale and sustainability, conditioned by the former. The beneﬁts for the working
class were short term, selective, restricted and assistentialist. The PT governed for large
capital – for the already privileged and powerful. The very expansion of primary exports
in this period can be considered a manifestation of a neoliberal, ﬁnancialized pattern of
accumulation from above.
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Accumulation from above can be deﬁned as the formation or expansion of (preexisting)
dominant capital (or groups of capital) through processes of social income and wealth
appropriation (as in the privatization, expropriation, and direct appropriation of public
land and resources, in addition to the control of production, trade and ﬁnance), for
which state command is essential. Neoliberalism is a speciﬁc pattern of accumulation
from above, assuming a speciﬁc form in the Brazilian context. The fetishization of such
a type of economics can assume various forms and enable the emergence of populist poli-
tics supported and legitimized by the masses.
Populism from above tends to be economically and politically transformative, changing
the relations of power within the bourgeoisie and, consequently, the patterns of pro-
duction, distribution and accumulation. These transformations require economic, social,
political and institutional reforms, possibly requiring top-down decision-making, a disci-
plinary, coercive state, and strong leaders that preach to the masses. President Vargas
(1930–1945 and 1950–1954), who led the process of industrialization in Brazil, could be
considered an example. Lula did not have these characteristics, and his policies were
not as transformative; rather, he maintained and nurtured the material and political
basis of neoliberalism through corresponding macroeconomic and social policies, but
under the promise of transforming the living conditions of the working poor.
In conversation with Gramsci and Singer, Oliveira (2006) argues that Lulism ﬂipped
Gramsci’s formula on its head: instead of the moral ascendancy of the possessing over
the laboring classes, the dominant was bent, consenting to be led by a representative
of the dominated, yet simply to reinforce the structures of their exploitation – a ‘hegemony
in reverse’ (Oliveira 2006). Lula, in turn, conceded to capital as a condition of power.
The myth of his political project relates to the illusion of creating an endogenous
growth process yielding social equity (neo-developmentalism) without attempting to
renegotiate power and property, rallying popular power in society and state decision-
making – a hallmark of populism. The masses were political agents in the instance of elec-
tions, expressing preferences, asking, hoping and waiting for support and change;
however their political participation was instrumental.
In some respects, petismo-lulismo represents a far purer populism – the impossibility of a poli-
tics based on organized class – than the classic cases of Vargas, Perón and Cárdenas. These
were, in various ways, authoritarian forms for the inclusion of the working class in politics
[under the tutelage of the bourgeois state]. Today’s neo-populism represents not the author-
itarian inclusion but the democratic exclusion of those classes from politics. (Oliveira 2006, 19)
Delivering material improvements to the poor without active engagement, Lulism
reinforced a passive political actor, allowed or stimulated political lethargy and con-
strained more ambitious demands of its own organized social base (as with the case of
agrarian reform and the MST), even creating important arms of social co-optation (as
with the case of CUT).
In brief, Lulism was the uniﬁcation of the main working class fraction without class poli-
tics, class forms of consciousness, organization or political struggle. Lulism was embodied
by the election of an authentic working-class president devoid of working-class power,
even though part of the left in Brazil pretended that this was the case (Oliveira, TV inter-
view, ‘Roda Viva’ Program, July 2012). This is exactly the uncritical treatment – or fetishiza-
tion – of transformative politics, so emblematic of populism of the left. Lula did not reﬂect
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the ideology of the ruling class, but came to represent the notion that it was possible to
succeed within the order.
The temporary success of his economic model was organically linked to a process that
undermined long-term economic development and social cohesion, leaving two easy sca-
pegoats – the left and the poor – increasingly exposed. Lula’s populism was economically
weak and politically vulnerable, allying a partial realization of the interest ‘from below’ to
the reproduction and expansion of a pattern of accumulation ‘from above’.
In 2011, with the global economy still in crisis, foreign investment stagnant and the
commodity price boom at its end, the BoP, ﬁnancial, ﬁscal, monetary and real crises
started to swell, becoming critical after 2013. As they unfolded, they exposed the limits
of the PT’s political project and their deceptive representation of the working poor. The
spell crumbled in Rousseﬀ’s hands. The next section sheds light into the political crisis
and the recent authoritarian turn.
The 2013 crisis and the political turn
Eu não vou pagar o pato (Fiesp)
… e a multidão caiu feito um patinho.
Rousseﬀ’s administration reacted to the economic crisis by advancing the developmental-
ist agenda. She intended to stimulate investment by granting a tax-friendly agreement to
targeted industries, making the exchange rate more competitive and reducing the interest
rate to its lowest in years. This move, however, irritated the rentier coalition, who saw it as a
threat to their economic privilege and political dominance. Rousseﬀ also failed to facilitate
the expected economic recovery, having underestimated the extent of the global crisis
and taken a series of precipitated and clumsy measures. In 2014, she was reelected by a
small margin of votes and, at the dawn of her second term, receded her developmentalist
promises and redirected her policies to the priorities of the ﬁnancial market – this time,
irritating her supporters and being left politically on her own.
It is worth recalling that, in June 2013, the PT was taken by surprise when more than
one million people angrily took to the streets to express widespread dissatisfaction with
the lack of provision of public services across the country (Saad-Filho 2014). The initial
protest against the rise of bus tariﬀs in São Paulo was catalyzed after ruthless political
repression. Thereafter, demonstrations multiplied in size and diversiﬁed in terms of
social composition and political demands throughout the month (Saad-Filho 2014, 1).
Although originally ignited by leftist claims to services such as free transport, the protests
were soon subsumed by the ‘entry of a disparate mass of middle-class demonstrators sup-
ported by the mainstream media’ (Saad-Filho 2014). The left withdrew from the streets,
and subsequently, the 2013 events fermented into an anti-PT sentiment, ultimately
boiling over with Rousseﬀ’s 2016 impeachment.
Operation Car Wash (Operação Lava Jato), an investigation of corruption and money
laundering conducted by the Federal Police starting in April 2014, was an important cat-
alyst. As it unfolded, the operation started to torment politicians, prominent entrepreneurs
and former employees of state-owned companies (such as Petrobras). Under the radar of
the investigation, they were threatened with the possibility of losing their political man-
dates and facing jail sentences, which mobilized them to seek the containment of the
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operation at all costs, including pushing for Rousseﬀ’s impeachment. In the public sphere,
Lava Jato was not only demoralizing politicians, but also undermining the overall legiti-
macy of the state, the national congress and other political institutions. With the explicit
use and support of the corporate media, this operation started to instrumentalize corrup-
tion and moralism to gain mass traction in favor of impeachment while keeping the inter-
ests of powerful ﬁnancialized economic groups invisible and intact.9
The vote from the agribusiness caucus in congress was decisive for impeachment. The
industrial and agrarian bourgeoisie abandoned the PT, voting against the developmental-
ist state – or against their interests – to form a single bourgeois coalition with the rentier
class. Carvalho (2018) provides two possible explanations. First, taking state control from
the PT, politicians could hold back Lava Jato, which could compromise the entire political
system. Second, by supporting impeachment and securing tighter control of the state,
economic sectors could save themselves from ‘the cost of one of the greatest economic
crises in recent history, imposing it on the rest of society’ (Carvalho 2018, chapter 3, A
panaceia do impeachment, author’s translation). São Paulo’s Industrial Federation
(Fiesp), the main beneﬁciary of Rousseﬀ’s recovery plan, launched the pro-impeachment
slogan, ‘I will not pay the price’ (Eu não vou pagar o pato), which was adopted by the
people, unaware of the cynicism.
The vote of the agribusiness caucus, in particular, seems to reinforce one of the argu-
ments put forward here: that the economic and political importance of the sector emerged
and made sense in the context of neoliberalism and ﬁnancialization.10 Boito and Saad-
Filho (2016, 194–5) also remark that the accumulation strategies of the domestic bourgeoi-
sie (or the productive coalition) depended on imperialism and the international (rentier)
bourgeoisie, sharing an ideology, culture, ﬁnance and other interests.
Singer (2015) suggests that the bourgeois political alignment that led to impeachment
was motivated by the fear of growing state activism, particularly seen during Rousseﬀ’s
ﬁrst term, and of the PT’s symbolic, moral and historical alliance with the working class.
The bourgeoisie’s relationship with Lula and the PT always carried the fear of radicaliza-
tion. In a country with enormous social inequality such as Brazil, the ruling classes experi-
enced Lulism as a ﬁrst manifestation of the class struggle – even though it temporarily
placated social tensions. Therefore, by giving up their immediate interests, the productive
coalition could avoid the greater risk of a worker takeover of politics (Singer 2015).
Lulism possessed an organic transformative potential not usually found in other
instances of populism. Considering the social proﬁle of its supporters, Lulism had the
potential to express demands deriving from, and thus compatible with, the material
and political interests of the working class. It could also develop the latent possibility of
mass mobilization and active intervention into the control of economic aﬀairs. The devel-
opment of such potential, however, was conditioned upon populism’s very demise.
The PT’s 13-year period of governance prompted certain transformations in that direc-
tion, for example, inciting an extensive and extended notion of citizenship and rights that
could have unfolded into a new moral ethos to redeﬁne social relations in the country.
9The rigged political role of Lava Jato, recently revealed (see the leaked material published by The Intercept-Brazil), reached
a pinnacle with Lula’s imprisonment, mentioned ahead.
10In 2005, the vote of the agribusiness caucus saved Lula from an impeachment process after the ‘mensalão scandal’. In this
context, commodity prices were high, and the sector was economically and politically more comfortable to support (and
continuing to count on) Lula’s government.
22 D. ANDRADE
What could happen when the new mass of people with a formal education did not ﬁnd
employment opportunities compatible with their new material and cultural aspirations
(Singer 2013)? The initial wave of protests in 2013 reﬂected the growing realization that
good jobs were scarce, the quality of urban services had deteriorated, and the cost of
such services had nevertheless increased. The situation evolved, however, in the least
desired way up to the 2018 presidential election.
Safatle’s (2018) remark is poignant: what was dramatic about the latest election was
that those who rightly wanted a rupture with the establishment were captured by and
radicalized to the extreme right, not the left. How did this occur? While this is not an
easy question to answer, it is fundamental to Brazil’s future. This newmodality of populism
of the left that aligns its progressive agenda to ﬁnancial capital accumulation provides
some insights into the recent shift to authoritarian, morally conservative and ultra-
liberal economic politics.
The economic crisis the PT led the country into was a crisis of the neoliberal pattern of
capital accumulation, externally dependent. Having done nothing to confront the power
of the propertied and rentier bourgeoisie, or to organize and politicize its social base –
having in fact concealed the antagonism in its class alliances and political representation
– the party was left with no legitimate authority, no basis of defense, and no line of attack
when the economic crisis and political accusations rebounded.
Lula and the PT, and, unfortunately, the left in general, were at the mercy of conserva-
tive forces and the media, who were left alone to frame the explanations for the crisis. A
ﬁctional ‘radical left’ (of ‘Marxists’ and ‘communists’) was forced to shoulder the burden of
the economic, social and moral collapse of the country. The PT and the left were scorned
and branded as irresponsible, incompetent, negligent and, above all, deeply corrupt.
The PT resorted to the only remaining option: reinforcing Lula’s leadership. Avoiding
explanations and self-critique, the party seemed to sustain the idea that the social suc-
cesses of the 2000s were directly and solely attributable to Lula and that he alone could
bring them back. Arguably, the party allowed for the political butchering of Rousseﬀ –
‘this inept woman’ – in 2016, gambling that it could make its comeback under Lula in
the 2018 election. It is important to note that Lulism is still alive and well; Lula was the
favorite candidate in the presidential campaign and was likely to have been elected in
2018 if the Superior Electoral Court had not blocked his candidacy a month before the
election was to take place.11
Lula’s social base, having passively experienced a multitude of changes, particularly in
purchasing power, but having not had a chance to understand why these changes were
limited and short-lived, remained faithful. Almost as a corollary, that same social base was
incapable of forming a political understanding to organize and oppose Rousseﬀ’s
impeachment, which only reinforces the aspects and eﬀects of populism discussed in
this article. During the presidential campaign, Lula sought to unite the organized left –
but around him – ultimately achieving the opposite.
The Brazilian people, resentful of the low quality of public services and other eﬀects of
the neoliberal order, indiscriminately voted for the absolute dismantling of the state and
11After a controversial and expedited trial in the context of Operation Car Wash, Lula received a 12-year prison sentence for
corruption and money laundering in April 2018. His campaign continued even in prison until September 2018, when
Brazil’s top electoral court ruled that his candidacy should be barred. The PT’s substitute candidate, Fernando
Haddad, began his campaign a month before the election, adopting a strategy to make him a virtual image of Lula.
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supreme neoliberal hegemony – a tragedy for which Lula bears responsibility. Bolsonaro
was elected as the option to remoralize public life, to bring economic and social order, and
to ‘put things right’. But whose order?
Conclusion
The contrast between ‘the sheer electoral weight of the poor, juxtaposed against the sheer
scale of economic inequality’ (Anderson 2011) makes Brazilian democracy latently explo-
sive. The country’s republican history expresses it well: it is permeated by dictatorships,
coups d’etat and populism, all making it evident that ‘political democracy was never
meant to reach the economic realm’ (Ayers and Saad-Filho 2015, 600). The political
system itself is a historically entrenched structure against working class formation and
organized struggle. Lula’s populism is part of this history, as is the impeachment of
Rousseﬀ, Lula’s imprisonment and the election of Bolsonaro.
Populism can be politically and economically transformative, but it is socially conservative,
reproducing rather than transcending social hierarchies and inequalities. The PT captivated
the support ‘frombelow’bypromotingmarginal income redistribution, innocuous for a trans-
formation – much less an inversion – in power relations in society and the political system.
Lula’s populism symbolically bent, but economically served the powers ‘from above’. His pol-
itical choicesnotonly cast down thegoal ofdevelopmentwith social equity, but also launched
Brazil into a long-term trajectory of instability and crisis (Gonçalves 2012).
Since the impeachment process, the MST became more openly supportive of the PT. Its
overt participation in Lula’s 2018 presidential campaign shed doubt on whether it rep-
resented a questionable electoral pragmatism or a regrettable Lulism. On the day of his
imprisonment, Lula powerfully declared that he had become ‘an idea’, set loose to
spread among the masses. This ‘idea’ must be disputed. In the face of growing authoritar-
ianism and attacks on workers, Lulism risks being reinforced, instead of gaining a critical
understanding of the political nature and related limits of the Workers’ Party project.
Without this understanding, no reliable counter-alliances and strategies can emerge,
let alone a conceivable path to emancipation. ‘A luta continua’, but class struggle (and
class analysis) must resume its critical role.
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